Up on the mountain at Monterey Pass, the
Confederates captured Mr. Jacob Daniel Baer as he traveled from
Gettysburg to Baertown to look after his property and neighbors
during the Confederate retreat. He was a veteran in the 17th
Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment and later served with General
Sheridan in 1864 as his orderly. Traveling to his home, Mr. Baer
was captured by Confederate pickets around 3:30 pm along with
David Miller. Mr. Miller later recalled “They gave my nephew,
Willie Waddell, and myself privilege to go wherever we wished, to
look after things, but required us to report every fifteen minutes
to Sergeant Grabill, who was stationed at the front door of the
house."
Meanwhile, Mr. Baer had come into contact with Susan Lookabaugh
and told her to get help. She managed to walk by the Confederate
pickets and headed toward Fountaindale, where she came in contact
with James Embley. Miss Lookabaugh told Mr. Embley about the
situation at Monterey Pass and asked him to get help.
Near the hamlet of Fountaindale Charles H. Buhrman, a local
farmer received this message from Mr. Embley who told him about
the capture of Mr. Baer and Mr. Miller at the Monterey House and
about the Confederate retreat on Jacks Mountain. Mr. Buhrman then
mounted his horse and traveled toward Emmitsburg looking for any
Federal soldiers in area that he could find. He came across one of
General Kilpatrick’s scouts two miles below Fountaindale. The
pickets escorted Mr. Buhrman to General Custer where he reported
what he was told. General Custer then escorted Mr. Buhrman to
General Kilpatrick.
Charles H. Buhrman. Image source: Bates'
Franklin County History |
Near Fountaindale General Kilpatrick was directing his
artillery to deploy and begin shelling the Confederates at
McMullin's Hill. Mr. Buhrman told General Kilpatrick about the
layout of the Confederate forces at Monterey Pass and told him
about the cannon planted in the middle of the road at the Clermont
House. When General Kilpatrick learned of the movement of the
Confederate cavalry only five miles away at Monterey Pass, he
immediately began to pursue the Confederate wagon train.
As Mr. Buhrman rode with General Kilpatrick, the 1st Michigan
Cavalry came across a local 12 year old girl named Hitty
Zeilinger, who told them that the Confederates had placed a cannon
near the Clermont House on top of the mountain. She knew Mr.
Buhrman and begged him to tell General Kilpatrick not to go up to
Monterey Pass. One of the 1st Michigan Cavalry soldiers lifted
12-year-old Hitty into his saddle and they traveled up the
mountainside together. They soon came to Charles Buhrman’s farm
where he told General Kilpatrick that this was as far as he would
go. General Kilpatrick asked Mr. Buhrman to continue with him as
his scout and Mr. Buhrman agreed.
General Kilpatrick traveled about one mile along Waynesboro
Pike, when he came across a Confederate scouting party that
belonged to Captain Emack. Using local citizens as guides,
Kilpatrick galloped through the rainy evening on a collision
course toward the Confederate wagons passing through Monterey. Mr.
Miller heard a great deal of movement outside of where he was
being held. He remembers "About dusk I saw a great deal of
commotion among them and asked some of the soldiers what was going
on. "Oh nothing! Just you report to Sergeant Grabill," was the
reply. I came to the house and asked Willie Waddell whether he
knew what was going on. "Yes," said he, "I just came down from the
observatory on the top of the house and could hear the Union
troops coming up the mountain."
It was about sundown when General Custer’s Brigade was at the
base of the mountain. The 5th Michigan was the first of
Kilpatrick’s Cavalry Division to climb the mountain. At around
9:00 pm Custer’s men came in contact with Confederate pickets from
Captain George Emack’s company of the Confederate 1st Maryland
Cavalry that was stationed near the Clermont House, located one
half mile south of Monterey Pass on the Waynesboro-Emmitsburg
Pike.
Hearing of General Kilpatrick's movements, Captain Tanner
ordered the cannon to be loaded while General Custer's men
approached Emack's position. As the weather conditions worsened,
the Federal soldiers failed to recognize the Confederate pickets
who were wearing black gum blankets over their uniforms. Without
making any demonstration, using their bodies to shield the gun,
Captain Tanner ordered the cannon to fire. The first shot was
fired directly into the head of the 5th Michigan Cavalry, causing
confusion and chaos in the ranks of the cavalrymen. The shots were
fired over their heads, but managed to get the 5th Michigan’s
attention and put fear in their hearts.
Captain Emack ordered the rest of his company to dismount and
deploy on both sides of the cannon. Captain Tanner’s men fired two
more shots. After the confusion subsided, Captain Emack's company
then mounted and charged forcing the 5th Michigan back, where
Kilpatrick's Artillery was stationed near McMullin’s Hill.
Allowing the 5th Michigan to reorganize before advancing back into
the mountain gap, Mr. Buhrman told Kilpatrick to dismount a
regiment and send them to the left of the road where they could
seize the cannon and possibly out flank Captain Emack’s men.
Kilpatrick thought the tactic suggested might work and he ordered
the 8th Pennsylvania to dismount and march through the dense
stretch of woods toward the Clermont House for the first advance
into Monterey Pass. The 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry covered the
ground about 100 yards to the left portion where the Clermont
house once stood and where Monterey Circle is today.
In a letter to the Valley Spirit in 1886, Charles Buhrman
recalled: “It was then getting dark in the evening. After passing
Clermont about the rebels fired three or four shots with grape and
canister, and then pulled up their battery, and retreated. I don't
think they killed any of Kilpatrick's men with the battery, as
they fired too soon, and the grape and canister went over our
men's heads; but it made some of our men retreat, and caused a
great deal of confusion. I told Kilpatrick if he would dismount a
regiment and go down through the edge of the woods, he could flank
them and capture the battery.”
Seeing that he might be out flanked, Captain Emack withdrew his
force about 200 yards past the Monterey House. This gave him time
to concentrate his force at the mountain pass. Captain Tanner then
ordered to have the cannon be redeployed from its current position
and reinforce Captain Emack near the Monterey House where his
troopers were ordered to deploy on both sides of the road. This
maneuver was carried out in such a hurry that Captain Tanner’s men
were forced to leave their caisson behind and members of the 8th
Pennsylvania took possession of it.
As the majority of General Kilpatrick’s Cavalry began to ascend
the eastern side of the mountain, Kilpatrick saw the conditions of
the road as his troops moved westward toward the Monterey House.
On his right was Monterey Peak, which was a rough rugged portion
of Monterey Pass. To the left was a steep ravine and to his front
was a road too narrow to even deploy his artillery. After Captain
Emack placed his troops near the Monterey House, Custer’s men
consisting of a portion of the 1st and 5th Michigan Cavalry began
their advance.
The 5th Michigan was sent toward the right to protect
Kilpatrick’s right flank. A small portion of the 1st Michigan
Cavalry was ordered to dismount and continue on the main road.
This forced Captain Emack to slowly fall back further westward
until the Custer’s Brigade gained the eastern half of Monterey.
This forced Captain Emack to withdraw his force even further back
to eastern side of the Maria Furnace Road where it connected to
the Emmitsburg and Waynesboro Turnpike.
General Kilpatrick stopped at the Monterey House where David
Miller and Jacob Baer were held prisoner. He dismounted and walked
up on the porch where Mr. Miller and Mr. Baer were. General
Kilpatrick started to discuss the roads of the area and where they
led when one of General Custer's men came riding up to the
Monterey House asking General Kilpatrick for more men. Kilpatrick
did not honor General Custer's request for more manpower. Later in
life Mr. Baer recalled that General Kilpatrick told the courier to
tell General Custer, "He had enough men and lick the hell out of
them!”
During the conversation, General Kilpatrick asked David Miller
about the roads and where they led. Mr. Miller informed General
Kilpatrick of the Mount Zion road that led into Smithsburg and
Leitersburg. General Kilpatrick then asked Mr. Miller who he knew
that could guide a regiment of his cavalry down the western side
of the mountain so they could try and cut off the Confederate
wagon train. David Miller saw Charles Burhman talking to some of
the Union officers, and he turned to General Kilpatrick and told
him that Mr. Buhrman was the man for the job.
General Kilpatrick asked Mr. Buhrman where he thought the wagon
train was going. Mr. Buhrman later recalled: “Kilpatrick asked me
which way I thought the wagon train was going, and where I
supposed they would strike the river. I told him they could go by
Smithsburg and Boonsboro, and cross the river at Sharpsburg, or go
by Leitersburg and Hagerstown and cross at Williamsport. He asked
me if there was any road that I knew of that I could take a
regiment and head off that wagon train. I told him there was that
I could take them by Mount Zion and then down the Raven Rock
Hollow and strike Smithsburg, and if they had not taken that road,
we could cross to Leitersburg and there we would strike them for
certain.”
General Kilpatrick ordered Lt. Colonel Preston of the 1st
Vermont Cavalry to take Mr. Buhrman as his guide and travel
through Blue Summit, taking the road leading to Smithsburg. This
wooden road took them through modern day Blue Ridge Summit and
Cascade to Smithsburg. Upon their arrival at Smithsburg they found
that everything was quiet. Mr. Buhrman then told Colonel Preston
to take the road leading to Leitersburg that was 4 miles away and
by daylight they had captured several prisoners and wagonloads of
supplies.
As soon as Colonel Preston and the 1st Vermont Cavalry rode off
toward Smithsburg, General Kilpatrick ordered Colonel Town to take
a regiment of his battalion to head off the retreating wagon
train. Near the Clermont House, the 1st Michigan Cavalry under Lt.
Colonel Peter Stagg was sent on a road leading to Fairfield Gap to
head off the Confederate wagon train coming out of Fairfield.
General Custer hired Emmitsburg resident James McCullough on
June 27th as a guide during the Pennsylvania Campaign, when the
Michigan Brigade encamped at the old Toll House south of
Emmitsburg. During the battle of Monterey, McCullough guided
Colonel Stagg’s 1st Michigan Cavalry to Fairfield Pass.
As all of this was happening at the same hour, General
Kilpatrick had made plans of an attack from the east and west
which was already underway; he now had to concentrate on gaining
the actual pass of Monterey in order to dislodge Captain Emack and
his Marylander’s. As the third wave of the battle was underway,
Custer’s men began to get disorganized.
After General Kilpatrick’s Cavalry gained Monterey Pass, they
continued down the mountainside to Waterloo (present day
Rouzerville). After the affair at Waterloo, General Kilpatrick
traveled to Ringgold, Maryland where he ordered his division to
halt. The casualties of these battles proved to be devastating for
the Confederates. General Kilpatrick stated his losses at Monterey
Pass were 1 killed, 12 wounded, and 30 captured. The Confederate
official reports state that the Confederates lost more than one
thousand men, captured at the battle of Monterey Pass along the
Waynesboro and Emmitsburg Road.
Once General Kilpatrick entered Ringgold, his men were tired
and the horses needed rest. A New York Times reporter
by the name of E. A. Paul
rode with Kilpatrick and saw first hand the condition of
Kilpatrick’s men. The men were tired, wet and covered with mud
from the battle of Monterey Pass. As the cavalrymen halted at
Ringgold, many men were so exhausted that they fell asleep in the
saddle. Kilpatrick’s Cavalry had been riding and fighting for
almost twenty-four hours without a break.
While General Kilpatrick’s Cavalry was riding toward Ringgold,
Maryland, Charles Buhrman and the 1st Vermont Cavalry had already
traveled down Mount Zion Road and then took the Raven Rock Hollow
and came out to Smithsburg. When they arrived at Smithsburg, not
one Confederate soldier was to be found and everything was quiet.
Mr. Buhrman thought that maybe the Confederate wagon train had
taken the road to Leitersburg. Colonel Preston ordered the 1st
Vermont to head toward Leitersburg and they arrived at daybreak
finding the road filled with Confederate soldiers, livestock and
the wagons that survived the battle of Monterey Pass.
Charles Buhrman later recalled: “The regiment I was with
captured a great many prisoners, cattle, horses, etc., and
destroyed the wagon train from Leitersburg back to Ringgold. There
they met the remainder of Kilpatrick's cavalry. They had destroyed
the wagon train from Monterey to Ringgold, a distance of six
miles, and from Ringgold to Leitersburg, a distance of three miles
more, making nine miles of wagon train captured or burned or
destroyed by cutting off wagon tongues and cutting spokes in
wheels. I am not able to say how much, if any, of the wagon train
was destroyed between Leitersburg and Hagerstown, as I went only
as far as Leitersburg with the 1st Vermont regiment, when it
divided, part going toward Hagerstown, and part toward Ringgold. I
went with the part that went toward Ringgold, as that was on my
way home. I left them about 8 o'clock on Sunday morning, and
started home by way of Ringgold.”
Charles Buhrman started for home. He rode by himself to
Ringgold where he was taken prisoner, by General Kilpatrick’s
pickets. As they escorted him to the old school house, Mr. Buhrman
explained that he was with Kilpatrick during the battle of
Monterey Pass, but the pickets didn’t believe a word Buhrman said.
As Buhrman walked into the schoolhouse several of Kilpatrick’s
officers recognized him. They ordered Buhrman’s release and he
continued toward home. Buhrman took the road leading to George
Harbaugh’s farm and as soon as he got up the hill, he saw
Confederate soldiers riding down the other side. Avoiding capture
by the Confederate soldiers, Buhrman traveled along the foot of
the mountain and rode his horse through the woods until he came to
Germantown Road near the schoolhouse.
From there he continued to the Sabillasville Road near Monterey
Pass where he found Confederate pickets that were guarding the
Frederick County, Maryland side. About sixty yards from the
Confederate pickets, he was spotted and they called to him to
dismount. Unable to jump a high fence near an orchard, Buhrman
recalled: “I was near the orchard fence, I "dismounted" over the
fence and did some good running from that to the Pine Swamp, about
one-fourth of a mile. They shot four times at me, but missed me. I
heard the balls whistle over my head, as it was down hill and they
shot over me. I lost my horse, saddle and bridle. I was in the
swamp only a few minutes until they were there; but as the bushes
were very thick, I soon got away from them and kept the woods
until I got home, two miles from there. It was then two or three
o'clock on Sunday afternoon.”
Once Buhrman was home, he spotted a detachment of Confederate
cavalry that was coming to his house. Buhrman hurried out the back
door, found one of horses, mounted it and rode toward the
mountain. The Confederate soldiers had searched his entire house
and they told Buhrman’s wife that if they found him they would
hang him. Buhrman hid in the mountains until the last of General
Lee’s Army had passed through Monterey.